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IN TRO D U C TIO N
The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 
m 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) m 1976 These treaties 
prohibit underground nuclear explosions having yields greater than 150 kilotons (kt) 
Although neither party has ratified either treaty both have separately stated that they will 
respect the 150 kt lim it
Previously the Reagan Administration has not sought ratification of these treaties on 
the grounds that 'we cannot effectively verify Soviet compliance with the 150 kiloton 
threshold on underground nuclear explosions The remote seismic techniques we must rely 
on today to monitor Soviet nuclear tests do not provide yield estimates with the accuracy 
required for effective verification of compliance 1 Yield estimates based on teleseismic 
body wave magnitudes (the method currently used by the U S government) are considered 
to be uncertain by a factor of two at the 95% confidence level2 This statement means there 
is one chance in 40 that an explosion with a most likely yield of 150 kt actually had a yield 
of 300 kt or more This uncertainty was apparently considered acceptable at the time the 
TTBT was signed As discussed later in this report, the best remote seismic methods now 
available have, according to some experts, an uncertainty of a factor of 1 5 at the 95% 
confidence level
Recently and m accordance with his agreement with the Congress just before the 
Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan has proposed ratification of the TTBT and PNET 
with reservations that they not go into effect until the Soviet Union agrees to new 
monitoring measures to improve verification The Administration is strongly advocatmg 
adoption of the hydrodynamic method of yield estimation which mvolves measuring the 
way m which the shock wave produced by an underground nuclear explosion propagates 
away from the point of detonation In particular the Administration advocates2 use of the 
so called CORRTEX technique for measuring the radius of the shock front as a function of 
time (CORRTEX is an acronym for continuous reflectometry fo r  radius versus time 
experiments) It believes that it has identified m the hydrodynamic yield estimation method 
an approach which will reduce the uncertainty in yield measurement to an acceptable level 
and will do so without danger of compromising other sensitive information about the nature
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or performance of the nuclear device whose yield is to be measured."2 The Administration 
has also stated that the accuracy of the hydrodynamic method is relatively mdependent of 
the geologic medium provided only that measurements are made m the strong shock 
region near the nuclear explosion and expects that the method would provide yield 
estimates initially accurate to within a factor of 1 3 of the actual yield at the 95% confidence 
level when applied at Soviet test sites to explosions with yields above 50 kt 2 Apparently 
the Administration considers that an uncertainty of this size is acceptable and hence that the 
method would provide effective verification of compliance with the TTBT and PNET
This report summarizes information that is publicly available about the hydrodynamic 
method of yield estimation and uses this information to consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of this method for monitoring nuclear test bans 3 Available unclassified data 
as well as theoretical modeling show that the shock wave produced by an underground 
nuclear explosion propagates differently in different geologic media. As a result, accurately 
estimating the yield of an explosion from measurements of the radius of the shock front as 
a function of time generally speaking requires knowledge of the test geometry and the 
medium However the available data and theoretical modeling mdicate that there is a 
relatively brief time during the outward propagation of the shock front when its motion is 
fairly insensitive to the nature of the medium, for those geologic media which have been 
studied If this time is known if data outside this interval are discarded in making the yield 
estimate if the test geometry is known not to be a significant disturbing factor and if the 
geologic medium in which the explosion takes place is one for which the U S has test 
data the available evidence indicates that the yield can be estimated to within a factor of 
about 1 3 using the hydrodynamic method
We therefore conclude that the hydrodynamic method could if used in conjunction with 
other measurements that determine the nature of the geologic media and exclude possible 
disturbing factors, provide estimates of the yields of Soviet tests near the 150 kt threshold 
that are less uncertain than the seismic method currently used by the U S government 
However the factor of 1 3 uncertainty expected with the hydrodynamic method is only 
marginally smaller than the factor of 1 5 uncertainty thought by some experts to be 
achievable with the best remote seismic methods now available
A key policy question raised by this study is whether attaching reservations to the 
TTBT and PNET to permit use of the hydrodynamic method to monitor tests near 150 kt is 
worthwhile given possible disadvantages and the modest reduction in the uncertainty of 
yield estimates that may be expected
YIELD ESTIM ATION METHODS
Phases o f a nuclear explosion deep underground —In the following discussion it will 
be helpful to have m mind what happens when a nuclear charge is detonated deep 
underground For present purposes the time developmént of the explosion may be divided 
into three phases (see note 4)
• First, the nuclear energy is released in less than a microsecond This process is 
accompanied by emission of various types of nuclear radiation The energy 
released produces a hot gas bubble in which the pressure and temperature nse 
steeply reaching several million atmospheres and about a million degrees 
within a few microseconds
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• Second the pressure of the hot gases in the bubble inmates a shock wave which 
moves away from the bubble in all directions at a speed that depends on the 
yield and is initially greater than the sound speed m the medium The shock 
wave compresses the rock through which it travels At this early time the shock 
wave is strong enough to completely crush the rock causing it to behave like a 
fluid This phase is therefore referred to as the hydrodynamic phase As the 
hot gases continue to expand they create a cavity of substantial size, while the 
shock wave continues to propagate away mto the surrounding medium The 
hydrodynamic phase ends when the shock wave is no longer strong enough to 
cause the compressed rock to behave like a fluid
• Third the shock wave continues to propagate away from the cavity, at first 
crushing or fracturing much of the rock in the region it traverses but gradually 
decreasing m strength until it eventually becomes the leading wave of a tram of 
seismic (elastic) waves, which propagate around and through the earth and may 
be observable thousands of miles away
Radiochemical method —This method of estimating the yield makes use of the effects 
of the nuclear radiation emitted during the first phase of the explosion on matenals exposed 
to them The radiochemical method is the most accurate one but m addition to the yield it 
can also provide other information about the design and performance of the nuclear device 
that has been regarded as too sensitive to reveal to the Soviet Union For this reason it is 
usually considered mappropnate m the context of treaty verification 5
Hydrodynamic method — In the hydrodynamic method of yield estimation the radius 
of the front of the shock wave is measured as a function of time dunng the second or 
hydrodynamic phase Generally speaking the larger the yield of the explosion the larger 
the radius reached by the shock front a given time after the detonation Thus 
measurements of the radius of the shock front as a function of time when combined with 
information on the nature and structure of the geologic media m which the explosion occurs 
and a model of the propagation of the shock wave through these media, may be used to 
estimate the yield of the explosion 6-9
CORRTEX is a particular technique for measuring the radius of the shock front as a 
function of time 1011 In this technique an electrical cable is lowered into the hole m which 
the nuclear explosive is placed (the so called emplacement hole) or mto another hole drilled 
near the emplacement hole (a so called satellite hole) When the expanding shock wave 
reaches the cable the cable is crushed and electrically shorted As the shock wave 
continues to expand the point at which the cable is crushed moves quickly toward the 
surface The way m which this pomt moves is measured by electronic equipment attached 
to the cable and located above ground For TTBT verification purposes the Administration 
is currently proposing placement of the sensmg cable m a satellite hole or holes With 
accurate knowledge of the location and orientation of the cable with respect to the 
emplacement hole, measurements of the point at which the cable has been crushed can be 
converted mto estimates of the radius of the shock front as a function of time
Seismic methods — Seismic methods make use of measurements of ground motions 
caused by the elastic waves that propagate around and through the earth dunng the third 
stage of an underground nuclear explosion descnbed above Several recent reviews of
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these methods exist (see for example refs 12-15) and so they will not be described 
further here
Discussion —It has been stated several tunes16-19 in the context of TTBT and PNET 
verification that the hydrodynamic method is direct whereas seismic methods are not 
From a scientific pomt of view there is no such distinction All three methods discussed 
here involve production of a signal by the exploding device, propagation of that signal to 
locations more or less remote from the detonation point and detection of the signal by 
sensors at those locations Important questions are how the size of the signal vanes with 
yield how well the propagation of the signal is understood and how accurately and 
precisely the sensors measure the signal It has also been implied that use of the 
hydrodynamic method in and of itself eliminates bias and therefore the need for calibration 
It does not All three methods are subject to both bias and uncertainty The issue is the 
actual or potential size of the bias and uncertainty likely to be encountered and whether 
these are so large as to be of concern The next section discusses the hydrodynamic 
method in more detail including possible sources of bias and uncertainty m yield estimates 
made using this method
HYDRODYNAMIC M ETHOD
There are three steps involved in using the hydrodynamic method to estimate yield 
They are (1) determine the properties of the geologic media m which the explosion will take 
place (2) measure the radius of the shock front as a function of time and (3) estimate the 
yield of the explosion by fitting a model of the motion of the shock front to the sequence of 
measurements of the radius of the front
Measurement o f the shock radius —Assuming that the geometry of the CORRTEX cable 
with respect to the detonation point and the time of detonation can be determined accurately 
the CORRTEX equipment can provide a quite accurate measurement of the radius of the 
shock front as a function of time Determining the geometry requires an accurate of survey 
of both the hole m which the CORRTEX cable is to be inserted and the hole in which the 
nuclear device is to be placed The time of detonation is determined from the time of arrival 
of the electromagnetic pulse (E M P )20 During a typical test the CORRTEX equipment 
records the radius of the shock front at several thousand times 10
Modeling the motion o f the shock front —In order to derive a yield estimate from the 
radius of the shock front as a function of time one must have a model of the propagation of 
the shock wave away from the detonation point This propagation has been modeled m 
several ways These include
• Use of one and two-dimensional hydrodynamic computer codes which 
numerically solve the fundamental conservation equations together with 
constitutive relations that describe the response of the geologic media to applied 
stresses 2122
• Use of one-dimensional similarity solutions that incorporate the equation of 
state of the geologic medium.3 7-9
• Use of an empirical power law formula whose parameters are estimated by fits 
to U S test experience 6-9 21
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No details were available to the author about the two-dimensional hydrodynamic computer 
codes and equations of state used to model ground shock propagation at Los Alamos21 at 
the closmg date for this report Nor are any unclassified CORRTEX data currently available 
Consequently the theoretical models described here are similarity solutions3 based on 
published equations of state7 9 23 while the test data mentioned are radius versus time 
measurements made using the so-called SLIFER method 24 a shock radius measurement 
technique that was used prior to the CORRTEX technique
Similarity solutions and SLIFER d a ta—The solutions discussed here make the 
following key assumptions (1) the explosion is spherically symmetric (2) the medium 
between the center of the explosion and the measuring cable or cables is homogeneous, (3) 
the shock wave is strong enough to crush the matenal through which it is propagating 
sufficiently to cause it to behave like a fluid (4) the properties of the shocked medium are 
adequately described by a Hugomot equation of the form D = a + bU, where D and U are 
the shock and particle velocities, respectively, and a and b are constants and (5) the 
similarity assumption that the specific energy of the matenal just behind the shock front is a 
constant fraction of the mean specific energy of the matenal within the shocked region 25 
The Rankine-Hugomot jump conditions across the shock front are of course satisfied 
Despite their simplicity, these solutions agree well with the available SLIFER data 
particularly if the phase changes that occur m some media at pressures below about 1 
million times atmosphenc pressure are taken into account3 7-9
At early times, the shock wave is strong and the similanty solution is a self-similar blast 
wave 3 7 8 During this phase the radius of the shock front depends on the density and 
equation of state of the medium and on the yield of the explosion No unclassified test data 
on this phase are available At moderately late times the similarity solutions predict that the 
shock wave will propagate as a self-similar compressional wave m the (crushed and 
fluidized) medium During this latter phase the motion of the shock front depends only on 
the so called plastic wave speed26 m the medium Over a broad range of intermediate 
times the similanty solutions are neither blast waves nor plastic waves Dunng this 
intermediate penod the shock wave is only moderately strong, m the sense that the shock 
velocity is only a few times greater than the plastic wave speed, and hence the radius of the 
shock front depends not only on the density and equation of state of the medium and the 
yield, but also on the plastic wave speed in the medium. The similanty solutions appear to 
give a good descnption of SLIFER data which are available at intermediate and moderately 
late times dunng the hydrodynamic phase 3 7-9
The similanty solutions and SLIFER data indicate that the shock wave produced by an 
explosion of given yield generally develops differently m different media This is not 
surpnsing since the density and plastic wave speed for example vary by factors of 1 6 
and 3 respectively for geologic media for which test data are publicly available 7 8 As a 
result* the charactenstic radius R where the shockwave produced by a 150 kt explosion 
changes from a blast wave to a plastic wave vanes from about 100 feet m wet tuff to over 
200 feet in dry alluvium In basalt and granite, R is about 120-130 feet for this yield 
Therefore a yield estimate made by fitting a model of shock propagation to radius versus 
time measurements over a broad interval will generally be biased by any errors m the 
assumed properties of the medium Similarly, unanticipated vanations m the properties of 
a given type of rock such as grämte within die deposit in which the explosion is detonated 
will introduce uncertainty m such a yield estimate
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However for the geologic media for which test data are available (the dry alluvium 
partially saturated tuff, saturated tuff granite, basalt, and rhyolite at the test sites used) the 
density equation of state, and plastic wave speed are correlated m such a way that there is a 
comparatively brief interval during the transition from blast wave to plastic wave when the 
radius of the shock front is relatively insensitive to the medium but relatively sensitive to 
the yield 3¿ 3 At present, this correlation does not appear to be well understood from any 
fundamental physical point of view The time at which this insensitive interval occurs 
depends on the yield W of the explosion as W l/3, varying from about 0 2 milliseconds 
after a 1 kt explosion to about 1 millisecond after a 150 kt explosion Almost all of the test 
data on which this conclusion is based come from nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test 
Site This conclusion is also reportedly supported by modelmg 22 If there are other 
relevant media whose properties are not correlated m this way the insensitive interval does 
not exist Thus insensitivity to the medium can only be assured for matenals that have 
been tested
Los Alamos algorithm —The algonthm used at Los Alamos to denve yields is to fit a 
power law equation (the so called Los Alamos formula) to CORRTEX data 6-9 21 The 
formula is fit over the time interval from 0 1 to 0 6 milliseconds after detonation for an 
explosion with a yield of 1 kt or 0 5 to 3 2 milliseconds for an explosion with a yield of 
150 kt These time intervals correspond to distances ranging from 6 to 16 feet from the 
detonation point for an explosion with a yield of 1 kt or from 35 to 85 feet for an 
explosion with a yield of 150 kt (Both times and distances are assumed to scale with W as 
W 1/3) They lie within the interval of insensitivity for media so far tested 3 Over this 
interval, the Los Alamos formula as quoted m the literature7"9 agrees with both the 
similarity solution and available SLIFER data to within a factor of about 2 (the published 
formula may not reflect current practice)
The Los Alamos formula is an empirical relation, i e , it is not derived from 
fundamental physical principles but is instead obtained by fitting a simple power law 
expression to a collection of shock wave data The formula must therefore be regarded as 
established only for those geologic media and pressure regimes where it has actually been 
verified At distances less than the stated lower limit of validity practical operational and 
engineering considerations make accurate measurements difficult At still smaller distances 
the formula disagrees with the similarity solution At distances greater than the stated upper 
limit of validity, the Los Alamos formula departs from the similarity solution and SLIFER 
data At these distances the radius of the shock front is no longer insensitive to the 
medium
In order to use the Los Alamos algonthm the cable must sample the insensitive 
interval In order to do this the cable must extend to within about 35 feet of the detonation 
point for a 150 kt explosion or within 6 feet for a 1 kt explosion Most of the data 
accumulated by the CORRTEX equipment are not within the insensitive interval The 
shortest pulse interval possible with current CORRTEX equipment is 10 microseconds 1° 
Thus of the 2 000 or so radius measurements made during an explosion all but about 40 
must be discarded for an explosion with a yield of 1 kt and all but about 200 for an 
explosion with a yield of 150 kt, in order to keep only data within the stated range of 
validity of the Los Alamos algonthm Data from outside this range can of course provide 
additional information on the yield and a check on the consistency of the algonthm if there 
is adequate knowledge of the geologic medium.
6
According to official statements 12 the Los Alamos algorithm gives yields accurate to 
within a factor o f 1 15 (at the 95% confidence level) of the yields given by the more 
accurate radiochemical method, for explosions with yields greater than 50 kt conducted at 
the Nevada Test Site According to these same statements, the formula is expected to be 
accurate to within a factor of 1 3 at Soviet test sites These statments aie consistent with 
the results of the present study provided that only data from within the region of 
insensitivity are used m the analysis that the media m which Soviet tests take place are 
within U  S experience that possible effects which could interfere with CORRTEX  
measurements can be excluded and that test geometries which would significantly disturb 
the shock wave from a spherically symmetric wave can be recognized and allowed for
Factors affecting hydrodynamic yield estimates —From the preceding discussion it is 
apparent that yield estimates made using the hydrodynamic method may be affected by a 
number of factors related to the geology of the test site and the geometry of the test 
Factors that may introduce bias or increase uncertainty include 6
• A n y  errors in  the su rvey  u sed  to  esta b lish  the path o f  th e CORRTEX ca b le  
rela tive  to  the em p lacem en t h o le  i f  the CORRTEX cab le  is  p la ced  m  a satellite  
h o le
• Any properties o f the nuclear device emplacement configuration or 
surrounding geologic media that cause the shock wave to propagate faster in 
one direction than another The size of these effects is less for high-yield than 
for low yield explosions
• Emplacement of cables or other aspects of the test setup that cause other 
signals to interfere with measurement of the ground shock radius as a function 
of time
• Any errors made in discarding data that are disturbed or are outside the 
insensitive interval and any errors in applying corrections to the data
Although over 100 tests have been earned out with the CORRTEX sensmg cable m the 
emplacement hole, expenence using current CORRTEX equipment with the cable placed 
down a satellite hole is apparently limited (according to official statements, only four tests 
with this geometry have been earned out2) SLIFER data from satellite holes are available 
for several tens o f earlier explosions 22
Possible requirements fo r  establishing confidence in the precision o f hydrodynamic 
yield estimates made at Soviet test sites — Clearly the more information that is available 
about the explosion and the nature of the geologic media m which it occurs and the more 
restnctions there are on the test geometry the more accurate the hydrodynamic method will 
be Some idea of the information that may be required to obtain uncertainties of a factor of 
1 15 to 1 3 is provided by the Protocol to the PNET which explicitly established the use of 
the hydrodynamic method as one of the monitoring methods that could be used for any 
explosion with a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kt At the time the PNET was 
signed the following information about the geologic medium was specified m the Treaty 
Protocol as needed to adequately venfy the Treaty 27
• The type or types of rock and their physical properties including density 
seismic velocity, porosity degree of liquid saturation, and rock strength
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• Specific features of the geologic structure that could affect the yield estimation
• The length of the canmster contaimng the nuclear charge [and possibly 
containing diagnostic equipment, in the case of a weapon test] the dimensions 
of the tube or other device used to emplace the canmster, the cross-sectional 
dimensions of the emplacement hole, the nature of the matenals (including 
their densities) used to fill the emplacement hole
• The configuration of any known voids with a volume greater than one cubic 
meter within the area
Measures specified to obtain this information included
• Examination of rock core or rock fragments removed from the emplacement 
hole, and of any logs or dnll core from exisiting exploratory holes
• A choice of one of several alternatives that mclude observation of construction 
o f the emplacement hole removal and examination of rock core or rock 
fragments from the wall of an existing exploratory hole, removal and 
examination of rock core or rock fragments from the wall of the emplacement 
hole and construction of one or more new exploratory holes
• Observation of the emplacement of the explosive and confirmation of the depth 
of emplacement
• Observation of the stemming of the emplacment hole
• Continuous unobstructed visual observation of the area of the entrance to the 
emplacement hole
• Photography of the extenor of facilities and installations associated with the 
conduct of die explosion
In addition, the Protocol placed specific limits on the dimensions of the canmster and 
required that tubes and conduits emerging from the emplacement pomt be filled with 
matenal of a density greater than a specified value These measures were motivated by the 
requirement that the sensing cables be placed m the nuclear device emplacement hole To 
ease many of the restnetive requirements of the PNET Protocol it has been proposed that 
CORRTEX cables be placed m satellite holes for verification of weapon tests
In order to provide assurance that the yield estimates derived from CORRTEX 
measurements are accurate for weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions near the 150 kt 
limit, Protocols specifying measures like these would be required 28
Relative intrusiveness —The CORRTEX method is more intrusive than remote seismic 
methods for the following reasons
• Personnel from the other country must be present at the test site before and 
during the test and therefore haVe an extensive opportunity to observe test 
preparations This would pose operational security problems
• Achievement of an uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 or less requires examination of 
the contents of the bore hole down which the CORRTEX cable is placed, and 
may require additional measurements and some constraints on test 
configurations (see above)
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• The canister containing the nuclear device and any diagnostic equipment must 
be examined to venfy that the conditions necessary for the yield estimate to be 
valid are satisfied For tests of nuclear directed energy weapons, this 
examination could reveal sensitive design information unless special procedures 
are followed 30
• Achievement of confidence in the estimated yield may, for some test 
geometries, require placement of several sensing cables around the weapon 
emplacment point
• Unless precautions are taken the CORRTEX sensing cable and equipment could 
be affected by the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by the explosion 
Such precautions might be considered a hindrance m carrying out some tests A 
detailed analysis of the EMP could reveal sensitive information about the design 
and performance of the nuclear device bemg tested Therefore the electrical 
equipment used for yield estimation must be designed so that it does not acquire 
detailed EMP signatures
Placing the sensing cable down the emplacement hole is relatively intrusive in weapon 
tests since in this location it is more likely to collect sensitive information that could reveal 
the nature of the test This problem would be alleviated if the sensmg cable is placed in a 
satellite hole, as proposed for TTBT monitoring
Use o f the CORRTEX method to monitor low threshold or comprehensive test bans —A 
question that has arisen repeatedly in discussions of CORRTEX is whether the method can 
be used at yields lower than 50 kt Underground nuclear explosions as small as 1 kt 
produce shock waves that evolve in the same way as those produced by explosions of 
larger yield At such yields some engineering and operational problems are likely to be 
more difficult For example drilling a satellite hole within 6 feet of the emplacement hole 
to the depths of typical nuclear device emplacement as would be required for use of 
CORRTEX to measure the yield of a 1 kt explosion appears challenging The need for such 
close placement would place restrictions on the size of the canisters used to contain the 
diagnostic instrumentation Use of small canisters with diagnostic hnes-of sight to the 
detonation point could disturb the CORRTEX measurements although placing the CORRTEX 
cable m a satellite hole should lessen such disturbances Because the radii to be measured 
are much smaller any survey errors become more important Apparently the feasibility and 
desirability of using CORRTEX for monitoring a low threshold test ban treaty have not yet 
been carefully studied
The CORRTEX method is not suited for detecting unannounced nuclear tests because it 
requires activity at the site in advance and the presence of monitoring personnel during the 
test Because it is only sensitive to nuclear explosions that are very nearby the method is 
also not suitable for monitoring a comprehensive test ban
Comparison with remote seismic methods —It may be helpful to compare the expected 
uncertainty of yield estimates made using CORRTEX with the expected uncertainty of yield 
estimates made using remote seismic methods As mentioned m the Introduction, yield 
estimates based on seismic body wave magnitudes (the method currently used by the U S 
government) are considered to be uncertain by a factor of two at the 95% confidence level2
However at least two other remote seismic methods are available a method based on 
measurement of surface waves and the so called Lg method which uses a wave guided in
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the continental crust If both these additional methods are assumed to provide independent 
yield estimates that are, like those denved usmg the body wave method uncertain by a 
factor of two at the 95% confidence leve yield estimates obtained by combining all three 
remote seismic methods would be uncertain by a factor of 1 5 at the 95% confidence 
level 31 32 (The actual uncertainty could well turn out to be less than this smce the 
uncertainty of yields estimated using the Lg method alone has been reported as a factor of 
1 3 at the 95% confidence level when the method is used for explosions with yields near 
150 k t 33)
This uncertainty of a factor of 1 5 expected by some experts is only marginally larger 
than the uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 which the Administration expects from use of the 
CORRTEX method Some experts think that the surface wave and Lg methods could 
significantly reduce the uncertainty of seismic yield estimates even if measurements are 
made only outside the Soviet Umon (some of these measurements would be at so called 
teleseismic distances of thousands of miles whereas others could be at so called 
regional distances) At large distances uncertainties m the attenuation of Lg waves 
become more important For this reason measurements at regional distances would be 
advantageous If many stations at regional distances are thought necessary this would 
require modification of the TTBT and PNET
CO N CLU SIO N S
In the present report we have reviewed information that is publicly available about 
hydrodynamic yield estimation methods and CORRTEX measuring equipment, and have 
considered the strengths and weaknesses of this approach for monitoring nuclear test bans 
Our key conclusions are as follows
• The hydrodynamic method and CORRTEX equipment could if used in 
conjunction with other measurements and some restrictions on test designs 
provide estimates of the yields of Soviet tests near the 150 kt threshold with an 
uncertainty of about a factor of 1 3 for test media withm U S experience
• The feasibility of using the hydrodynamic method and CORRTEX to monitor a 
threshold test ban treaty with a threshold substantially less than 150 kt has not 
yet been studied carefully There are engineering and operational difficulties 
that may be expected m usmg the method to momtor a low threshold test ban 
and that need to be examined m a verification context
• The hydrodynamic method is not suited for detecting unannounced nuclear 
tests or for monitoring a comprehensive test ban agreement
• The uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 at the 95% confidence level expected for the 
hydrodynamic method and CORRTEX is only marginally smaller than that 
thought to be achievable with the best remote seismic methods now available 
which according to some experts are expected to have an uncertainty of a factor 
of 1 5 or less at this same confidence level
A key policy question raised by this study is whether attaching reservations to the TTBT 
and PNET to permit use of the hydrodynamic method to momtor tests near 150 kt is 
worthwhile given possible disadvantages and the modest reduction m the uncertainty of 
yield estimates that may be expected
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